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Mathematics is not a science from our point of view, in the sense that it is not a natural
science. The test of its validity is not experiment.
— Richard Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics
It’s a Noisy World
Complexity exists at every scale, whether we look upward at the skies or below the surface of our
feet. Whether it be understanding the genome, modern computers, or the weather, one thing is true:
we live in highly uncertain, unpredictable and largely inscrutable universe. Our predictions typically
require simplification and averaging, allowing us to develop linear narratives which factorise neatly
in our scientific understanding. This is the picture that modern science has unearthed.
In complex systems errors compound and information rapidly dissipates through frequent inter-
actions with the other subsystems. At every step, randomness enters the picture creating a world
that is fundamentally noisy. Even the deepest regions of space are never truly quiet. The after-
glow of the big bang buzzes in the background and virtual particles pop in and out of existence.
No matter where you are in the universe, you cannot escape noise. The laws of thermodynamics
and quantum mechanics ensure dissipation and random fluctuations will follow your predictions
everywhere.
One might seek peace and quiet in the abstract, and turn to pure mathematics and symbolic
logic. Bertrand Russell described mathematics as possessing “not only truth, but supreme beauty—
a beauty cold and austere, like that of a sculpture”. Russell made these remarks in 1907 prior to the
publication of Principia Mathematica. Kurt Go¨del showed that mathematics as a closed axiomatic
system can be neither complete and consistent—there must be at least one unprovable axiom, or a
single contradiction: The marble edifice contained cracks. Alan Turing traced these fissures through
to their logical conclusion. Turing envisioned mechanical devices—a Turing machine—capable of
processing input signals, executing logical functions and then writing the results. In short, a Turing
machine is an attempt to mechanise mathematics. Logically, he imagined a universal machine
capable of emulating all of mathematics. Like Go¨del, Turing turned this system on itself and
asked the seemingly simple question ‘is there a function it could not compute’? His answer was the
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baffling Halting problem: Assuming a given input and problem, could the Turing machine determine
whether it would return a definite answer, or continue to run indefinitely? Turing showed this meta
problem is undecidable. Moreover, his work linked the unprovability of Go¨del’s theorems to the
new notion of undecidability. Needless to say his work laid the foundations of modern computers,
proving that these results do not compromise the utility or beauty of mathematics, but rather limit
the capacity of mathematics to describe itself.
So where does this leave us? Nature appears to be unpredictable and uncertain because of
thermodynamics and quantum mechanics. Mathematics, as a closed axiomatic system appears
to be unprovable and undecidable. These two perspectives live on opposite sides of a Platonic
divide; the difference between objects (nature) and forms (abstractions). But Turing machines are
mechanical by definition so a physical realisation of mathematics should indeed be possible. As
Fredkin and Toffoli put it [1]
Computation–whether by man or by machine–is a physical activity, and is ultimately
governed by physical principles.
This sentiment dates back to Szilard’s exorcism of Maxwell’s demon and the work of Landauer [2]
who contrived the punchy line information is physical [3].
This idea can be demonstrated rather simply; let us try to construct an infinite loop like the
Halting problem on a laptop. Our CPU requires energy to perform the underlying calculation.
Thankfully we have a battery as an energy source. As the CPU processes this calculation, it heats
up due to the dissipative nature of several logical primitives. Our laptop is currently erasing its
memory to avoid clogging up with information, causing it to heat up further. All this heating
increases the error rate in the processing unit. An underlying architecture of error-correction kicks
into gear to preserve the fidelity of our computation. This consumes further energy slowly draining
our battery. We plug the laptop into the wall where it draws energy from the local power station to
continue on with the calculation. Eventually enough time will pass where the computer components
begin to degrade and fail. Our only option is to replace these failing parts in real-time without
interrupting the calculation. And so on until the end of the universe.
What happens to your calculation if a single link in this complex chain breaks? The infinite
loop is going to halt. This example reveals a simple principle; closed physical systems only have
access to finite pool of resources and will always require an external environment to source their
energy and dissipate heat. In the world of finite systems, nature will always force a solution to
the Halting problem because nature does not permit contradictions: The asymptotic predictions
of closed axiomatic systems can never exist in the physical world. This pertinent observation can
be gleaned through the historical conversations surrounding the construction of computers. A
computer is an attempt to build a closed logical system, embedded in the physical world. But just
like a steam engine, it requires an energy source which necessarily slaves it to the universal laws of
thermodynamics. All physical computers, whether vacuum tubes or modern quantum computers
require external power supplies. Coupling to an external environment ensures noise and dissipation
are constants which must be handled by error-correction.
Halting problems and Universal Turing machines may exist in the realm of abstractions—that
cold austere realm of vectors, perfection and infinity—but physically they are fantasies. If this
abstract realm exists, we can never access it with physical Turing machines. All physical systems
require energy which must be sourced from an environment and repaid with entropy; a universal
truth upheld by the second law of thermodynamics.
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Determinism vs In-determinism
We should then carefully delineate between two broad classes of physical theories; deterministic
and in-deterministic theories.
Deterministic theories, like those of classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, deal with the
dynamical evolution of a completely specified microscopic state. In both theories of classical and
quantum mechanics, the evolution of the underlying dynamics is predicted by a known differential
equation i.e the Lagrangian, Hamilton or Schro¨dinger equation. Moreover, both cases of determin-
istic theories are perfectly time reversible. If we start with a state ψ(t0) and compute it at later time
ψ(tf ), we can reverse the temporal direction and recover the initial state ψ(t0). From the perspec-
tive of thermodynamics, a reversible processes is one that remains in thermodynamic equilibrium
with its environment. Consequently, no information is lost and every interaction is accounted for.
In either case there is one constant; entropy does not increase. Reversible processes are of course an
asymptotic approximation of reality, albeit a very useful one. Such an approximation is only valid
when the separation of time scales between the system and its environment are large. Deterministic
theories like a microscope, focus down on a highly specific piece of nature by closing out the rest of
reality.
In-deterministic theories on the other hand describe the macroscopic behaviour of an entire
ensemble. Statistical mechanics and kinetic theory are examples of such in-deterministic theories.
They provide powerful insights into the epiphenomena emerging from large numbers of interacting
subsystems. Curiously, emergent properties such as temperature, pressure and entropy have become
subject to new deterministic models such as the ideal gas law and the laws of thermodynamics. Most
importantly, in-deterministic theories are irreversible with regards to the underlying microstate.
Sometimes called out-of-equilibrium dynamics, irreversible processes arise when the separation of
time scales between a system and its environment is small. Thus, interactions between the two
cannot be discounted. If the environment is not constantly monitored, these interactions will
manifest as dissipation; the transfer of heat (energy) between the two. Dissipation produces entropy
at a finite rate and underpins the second law of thermodynamics. In complex systems with millions
of interacting parts, it is computationally intractable to trace the dynamics of every degree of
freedom. We must coarse grain our observations, the price of which is a probabilistic description of
the underlying microstates and the introduction of noise.
These two approaches are colloquially known as the theories of closed and open systems respec-
tively.
Mechanical Mathematics
Is mathematics physical? For many, the answer is a definite no and it is something more funda-
mental. Mathematics is an idealised set of abstract forms divorced from physics. Unsurprisingly
many disagree with this dualism—most notably physicists. Rather pragmatically, they posit that
because physical systems perform the abstract task of mathematics—pens, pencils, and brains—
then the emergent phenomenon of mathematics must too be physical. However, this perspective
holds for the application of mathematics i.e bridging the Platonic divide and phyiscally realising
mathematical abstractions.
One of the most illuminating perspectives on the physicality of mathematics originates from
the discussion surrounding the construction of real world Turing machines; that swinging bridge
between the abstract and mechanical.
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Rolf Landauer synthesised this attitude succinctly when he wrote “that the tools of mathematics
are physical, and therefore mathematics is limited by nature” [2]. This reasoning—now fairly
widespread—is primarily tied to the development of modern computers. The logical processing of
mathematics requires physical objects to carry out mathematical operations which are subject to
physical constraints. Landauer proposed the minimum energetic cost of irreversible computation in
a system at temperature T is kBT ln 2; this principle now bears his namesake [4]. Others have since
identified similar constraints pertaining to the processing rate of physical information [5] through
to the computational capacity of the universe [6].
In Roger Penrose’s best selling work The Emperor’s new mind, he wrote that a Turing machine
is “a piece of ‘abstract mathematics’ and not a physical object” [7]. Externally, this idealised
machine has the ability to draw from an unbounded pool of resources—or as he calls it ‘rough
paper’. Internally it contains a finite number of discrete states, but is capable of reading, writing
and processing this infinite amount of rough paper.
Penrose confessed that this construction is a little uncomfortable since shifting an infinite piece
of paper might be technically impossible. Instead, he circumvents this peculiarity by proposing that
rough paper could be an external environment which the machine is embedded in. The machine
reads and writes from the environment in a perfectly deterministic fashion. This view provides a
useful picture regarding the construction of a Turing machine in a physical world, but is equivalent
to that old English adage of ‘having your cake and eating it too’. The Turing machine is treated as
a deterministic closed system but sources its energy from an external environment. By definition,
this is impossible to do without introducing errors. Penrose’s machine cannot physically do work
on any input/output without an environment doing work on the system. This necessarily implies
the Turing machine is not in thermal equilibrium with its environment. Therefore, this theoretical
description of a physical Turing machine is both dissapative and in-deterministic. Any result relying
on an unphysical assumption such as the deterministic sourcing of energy from an environment must
be taken with a grain of salt or we must permit, by the same token, the construction of perpetual
motion machines.
A more thorough picture espoused by Fredkin and Toffoli considers the irreversible nature
of logical primitives required in modern classical computing [1]. Several of these primitives—for
example, the AND gate—are intrinsically irreversible. In their words “performing the AND operator
one generally erases a certain amount of information about the system’s past”. This is the physical
reason your CPU requires constant cooling. All this ‘forgetting’ generates heat which must be
dumped back into the environment. To avoid all this waste, they proposed a new microscopic and
reversible model of computation which they termed ‘conservative logic’. I will not elaborate on
the technicalities of this article, but they assert that dissipationless computation is indeed possible
and the energy involved is no greater than what is required to read/write the input/output signals.
The underlying process of abstract mathematics could be done—in theory—free of charge. In this
sense, the physical restrictions of doing mathematics was not in the mathematics itself, but rather
encoding it in a physical structure.
Despite being free of energy consumption, conservative logic—like its dissipative counterpart—
still requires a foundation of error-correction or post-selection to handle internal/external errors
[8]. This landmark result along with the work of Benioff [9] kicked off the quantum computing race
and was an early link between quantum mechanics and Turing machines, a theme we will return to
shortly.
The limitations I discussed in Penrose’s picture apply in part to Fredkin and Toffoli’s result.
Their conservative logic proposition still requires energy consumption when embedding the logic
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in a physical structure. As we will discuss, this process is irreversible, even down at the quantum
mechanical limit. While the underlying mechanics might indeed be reversible, coupling to an
environment ensures noise will creep in and errors will sabotage the calculation. If the external
world is to be the source of energy, then doing the abstract task of mathematics still requires we
model the whole process as intrinsically irreversible.
Error-correction
Let’s assume that we can construct a Halting problem on a physical Turing machine TH . Its
central processing unit is intrinsically reversible but is still embedded in an infinitely large physical
environment. As we discussed, energy is still required to read and encode the data. Critically, this
opens the processing unit up to noise which generate errors and corrupt your Halting calculation;
for some unexplained reason, your Turing machine is going to randomly halt. A remedy would be
to include a third system, another Turing machine TE embedded in the same environment which
constantly performs error-correction on TH . By doing so, TH can be certain that the data it is
processing is error free. Ideally the Turing machine TE never makes an error, but given it too is
embedded in the same physical environment it will make errors from time to time. Unsurprisingly,
it too must be monitored by another system TF . Error-correction is thus, a necessary component
of physical Turing machines.
Error-correction fundamentally relies on a computational space larger than the subspace per-
forming the calculation—otherwise known as the code space [10]. The input signal is encoded into
the Turing machine, which casts the logic into larger mathematical space. This new space must be
large enough to distinguish between different types of errors. For example, if our input tape was
just a binary string of 0s and 1s, these would be called bit flip errors where 0 → 1 and vice versa.
To detect simple bit flip errors, we require at least two additional bit per encoded bit for successful
error-correction.
In principle, a Universal Turing machine should possess error-correcting logic in its repertoire
of functions. Thus we could draw a larger box around TH and TE and call this joint system
our Universal Turing machine. An interesting digression is the following consideration; inside our
Turing machine we have split the logic functionality in two; half of our Universal Turing machine is
processing the self-referential logic whereas the other half is simply error-correcting. In this sense,
self-reference in physical systems does not refer to the self as a whole, but rather only the subsection,
or more precisely the code space. But let’s not be too hasty and forget about the errors arising in
TE which might also make errors. Naively, we could just extend the Turing machine indefinitely
to include more and more parts, each of which is monitoring another part of the Turing machine
ad infinitum. However, a more physically realistic argument would be that Turing machines can
only support Halting-like problems in a physical world by relying on the external network of other
machines providing error-correction.
But what game are we playing here? Like sailors on a sinking ship, we are frantically trying
to plug leaking holes of noise. With the introduction of more and more error-correcting units, we
are merely patching hole after hole but never truly closing the system. Also, error-correction does
not only apply to the software of the Turing machine. With the passing of time, the degradation
of the physical Turing machine is going to introduce further errors. Only constant repair and
replacement of parts is going to keep this undecidable calculation running—another form of error-
correction. Error-correction is thus an attempt to stave off the unalterable march of the second law
of thermodynamics.
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Quantum Reality
Quantum physics is one of modern science’s crown jewels of—despite its peculiarities. Any physical
realisation of a Turning machine must comply with the rules of quantum system. We are thus lead
to the Church-Turing-Deutsch (CTD) principle, which succinctly states [11]:
Every finitely realisable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal quantum
computer operating by finite means.
Note that the CTD principle is not a thesis like the Church-Turing thesis. The difference being
the CTD principle is subject to constraints such as physical systems, measurements and encodings.
Quantum computers—like Turing machines—are capable of executing mathematical logic on quan-
tum mechanical hardware. Their processing logic is entirely reversible as it’s evolution is governed
by the Schro¨dinger equation. This hardware offers fundamental resources that are off-limits to
classical computers, including entanglement, discord and superposition. Furthermore, the inherent
uncertainties arising from Heisenberg uncertainty principle need not put constraints on reversible
logic gates [12]. This is why quantum computers are the subject of the CTD principle and not clas-
sical computers. In characteristic fashion, Feynman tersely summarised this idea in his infamous
1982 talk; “nature isn’t classical, dammit, and if you want to make a simulation of nature, you’d
better make it quantum mechanical” [13].
In saying this, we should not delude ourselves that quantum computers are omnipotent com-
puting machines. While the underlying hardware is reversible and their computational ability far
outstrips that of their classical counterparts, the full mechanical picture of quantum computation is
still irreversible. Building a universal quantum computer capable of supporting a Universal Turing
machine would be subject to the same limitations outlined above. Dissipation enters a quantum
computer through the same routes as a classical computer, via the process of encoding, measure-
ment and error-correction. When a quantum system is prepared, an external probe must instantiate
its quantum state. When a quantum system is measured, it’s wave function collapses—in the most
common interpretation—and randomly returns a value associated with the measured observable
according to some probability distribution1. These ideas are deeply rooted in language of quantum
physics. We talk about ‘opening’ up Schro¨dinger’s box or ‘reading’ off the state of the wave func-
tion. The quantum computer must be opened up temporarily for preparation and observation via
an experimental apparatus.
The work of Toffoli and Fredkin is foundational here. Operated at its most advantageous
limit, a quantum computer still requires an energy source to encode and decode the inputs and
outputs. The energy source must come from an external environment out of thermal equilibrium
with the system and thus, subjects the quantum device to similar thermodynamic constraints as
it’s classical counterpart [14]. This environment plays the role of the irreversible “observer” in
quantum mechanics: It also serves as the experimental apparatus. Moreover the coupling between
the system and the apparatus is finite and limited by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle; their
can be no instantaneous or perfectly localised measurements in quantum physics. The price of
this delineation is an increase in entropy and the introduction of noise. Internally, we can rectify
these errors by introducing further ancillary systems within our computer whose sole function is
to perform error-correction. These ancillary systems are periodically measured and condition the
wavefunction, ensuring it executes error free. But again, we are playing this same game of trying
to close a system from an external world that it draws its energy from.
1I will not digress into a rather contentious discussion regarding the interpretations of quantum mechanics here
but will rely only operational output of the theory in this essay.
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Finally a remark regarding those who subscribe to “the church of the higher Hilbert space” i.e
extending the boundaries of the environment to close out the system. The coupling between system
and apparatus I have described draws a hard boundary delineating the two, otherwise known as the
Heisenberg cut. Taking a microscopic picture, the system and the apparatus become entangled i.e
the quantum mechanical wavefunction of the two cannot be separated. In this context the apparatus
and the system form a new closed system in a superposition of all possible prepared and measured
outcomes. However, if the environment is large then the sensitive coherent interaction between
these two is rapidly dissipated. There is a vanishing probability that the quantum correlations
between the system and environment can be preserved in a thermal bath. This is known as a the
Markov assumption, whereby the environment is viewed as conditionally independent of the system.
Furthermore, recent research suggests that gravity introduces a further source of decoherence [15],
which is closely related to the gravitational collapse models espoused by Penrose [16]. Because
gravity cannot be screened off like other interactions such as electromagnetism, it implies no sub-
system can ever be truly isolated. Even if you manage to close your system off from a noisy external
environment, the canvas of spacetime may introduce it for you.
Conclusion
All asymptotic predictions of closed axiomatic systems can never exist in the physical world. The
abstract notion of a Universal Turing machine cannot exist as a physical subsystem without the
introduction of noise from an external energy source. While it is theoretically possible to build a
processing device which is fundamentally non-dissapative such as quantum computers, the process
of inputting and outputting information requires energy and introduces noise. Additionally it re-
quires an internal mechanism of error-correction to make the program robust against errors. The
processing logic of error-correction must come from an external processing unit also sourcing its
power from the environment. By implication, the physical realisation of indefinite self-referential
logical program such as the Halting problem relies on an external network of other external log-
ical processors to prevent errors. We can no doubt build a system that executes the logic of an
undecidable problem, but it is existence is guaranteed to be temporary by the ever rising tide of
entropy.
The mathematical paradoxes uncovered by Turing and Go¨del do not bear any consequence on
the physical world because they can never be truly realised in physics. I am uncertain whether
we will ever bridge the Platonic divide, but I am certain that Universal Turing machines are not
a viable avenue to do so. Like many other mathematical anomalies arising in the realm of forms,
they are denied a physical existence by the laws of thermodynamics.
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